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Abstract
On September 17, 2009—the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 that marked
the beginning of World War II—the Obama Administration announced its intention to shelve plans
for the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) that had been developed under former President George
W. Bush. Pointing to a new intelligence assessment, President Obama argued that his predecessor's
plan to deploy an X-band radar station outside of Prague, Czech Republic, and 10 two-stage
interceptor missiles in Poland would not adequately protect America and its European allies from the
Iranian threat and reiterated his opposition to utilizing unproven technology in any European BMD
architecture.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss2/439
Ballistic Missile Defense: New 
Plans, Old Challenges
By Elizabeth Zolotukhina
Introduction
On September 17, 2009—the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of 
Poland in 1939 that marked the beginning of World War II—the Obama 
Administration announced its intention to shelve plans for the U.S. Ballis-
tic Missile Defense (BMD) that had been developed under former Presi-
dent George W. Bush. Pointing to a new intelligence assessment, 
President Obama argued that his predecessor's plan to deploy an X-band 
radar station outside of Prague, Czech Republic, and 10 two-stage inter-
ceptor missiles in Poland would not adequately protect America and its 
European allies from the Iranian threat and reiterated his opposition to 
utilizing unproven technology in any European BMD architecture.1
A Revised BMD Deployment Strategy
Based partly on the intelligence assessment, which suggests a sharper 
threat from Iranian short-range missiles rather than from a future Inter-
Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capability (Iran does not yet have 
such a capability), the President unveiled a revised BMD deployment 
strategy. This plan would use smaller, mobile SM-3 interceptors to 
counter short- and medium-range missiles, based first aboard Aegis-
equipped ships and possibly later on land in Eastern Europe.2 Although 
issues of cost and effectiveness cloud this proposal,3 recently, the U.S. 
Senate unanimously adopted an amendment to the fiscal year (FY) 2010 
Military Construction Appropriations Bill allowing the Pentagon to use 
$68.5 million in unspent fiscal 2009 missile defense funds to build a 
Hawaii test facility for the Navy's Aegis Weapons System, which is central 
to realizing the administration's revised BMD deployment strategy.4
The decision, which has been characterized as "one of the biggest national 
security reversals of his young presidency,"5 received praise by some 
observers while fueling discontent among others. Many Republicans 
derided the move for appeasing Russia and Iran at the expense of Amer-
ica's European allies, while some Democrats were displeased because the 
administration had not scuttled the European BMD plans entirely. Mean-
while, some Czech and Polish leaders—who had probably anticipated the 
Zolotukhina: Ballistic Missile Defense: New Plans, Old Challenges
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010Journal of Strategic Security
40
decision even if they were not informed of the precise details or timing of 
the public announcement until shortly before media leaks forced the Pres-
ident to deliver a hasty speech on the topic6—reacted to the Administra-
tion's decision with "deep dismay"7 fearing that Washington had 
succumbed to Russian pressure, and Atlanticist politicians in Prague felt 
"humiliated."8 In addition, former Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topo-
lanek, whose government cooperated closely on the BMD issue with the 
Bush Administration despite domestic opposition to the proposal, issued 
a statement in which he raised questions about "whether the United 
States is stepping back from the region of Central and Eastern Europe in 
exchange for better relations with Russia."9 That sentiment was also 
expressed in the letter of concern written by many former East European 
leaders to the Obama Administration.10 
The public response of the Polish government has been more measured. 
Unlike the Czechs who had adopted a more compromising negotiating 
position,11 the accord Warsaw signed in August 2008 with the outgoing 
Bush Administration pledged to deploy a Patriot battery operated by 100 
U.S. service members—an extra source of some controversy among Polish 
citizens—to augment the country's air defense capabilities in Poland. This 
plan was in addition to the 10 two-stage interceptor missiles that com-
prised Poland's share of the BMD architecture under the Bush plan. While 
Poland has reluctantly12 agreed to host SM-3 missiles,13 which are part of 
the Obama Administration's revised BMD deployment plan, Warsaw 
would like to see Washington abide by its promise to deploy a Patriot bat-
tery on Polish soil. The U.S.-financed move, which would be viewed as a 
symbol of NATO's commitment to the country's defense and fully inte-
grated with Poland's air-defense system, elicits concern from American 
officials who say that "there is still plenty to discuss"14 in this regard.
The Russian Reaction
President Obama has at various times denied that the reversal of the 
European BMD policy was an attempt to appease Russia, which has 
strongly objected to the plan on the grounds that it would threaten its own 
nuclear arsenal. Nonetheless, many governments in the region have inter-
preted the reversal as an attempt to elicit Moscow's cooperation in impos-
ing additional sanctions on Iran for noncompliance with several United 
Nations National Security Council (UNSC) resolutions related to Tehran's 
nuclear program, or a signal of American withdrawal from East/Central 
Europe.15 In an attempt to counter these perceptions, the administration 
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dispatched Vice President Joseph Biden to the Czech Republic, Poland, 
and Romania approximately one month after the decision was 
announced.
In the Czech Republic, Vice President Biden reassured the assembled 
leaders that the Obama Administration would "exert influence where pos-
sible"16 to ensure that Prague—which currently receives the vast majority 
of its oil and natural gas supplies from Russia—does not become even 
more dependent on Moscow. In return, interim Prime Minister Jan Fis-
cher reiterated Czech support for the new American missile defense plan 
under NATO auspices and for the Alliance's missions abroad. As planned, 
shortly after Biden's visit, high-level Czech and American defense officials 
gathered in Prague to consider the role that the country would play in the 
revised missile defense architecture. Following the consultations, U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Alexander Ver-
shbow told the media that Washington had "[presented] ... some concrete 
ideas to begin that process of developing the Czech role in the new 
approach," and added that part of the Czech Republic's role could be the 
hosting of "potential facilities here on the territory of the [country]."17 
Biden also received a relatively warm reception in Poland.
Moscow's reaction to the news of Obama's decision has been mixed. 
Although Russian President Dmitry Medvedev welcomed the move using 
cautious language, other high-ranking officials, such as Dmitri Rogozin, 
Moscow's envoy to NATO, have termed the policy shift "a mistake that is 
now being corrected,"18 and characterized it as a response to an agree-
ment allowing the transit of American military supplies and personnel 
through Russian and Central Asian territories to Afghanistan. Vladimir 
Putin, the Russian Prime Minister, said that he expected additional con-
cessions from the United States, while General Nikolai Makarov, Chief of 
the Russian General Staff, noted that the BMD plans "had only been mod-
ified not scrapped."19
Conclusion
Despite the unforgiving rhetoric, Medvedev now is reportedly "100 per-
cent ready"20 to back new sanctions on Iran for Tehran's noncompliance 
with UNSC resolutions related to Tehran's nuclear program, one of the 
oft-cited, and frequently denied, benefits of Washington's revised BMD 
policy. However, the Russian President's statement should be viewed with 
a degree of caution given that Putin is an opponent of sanctions on the 
grounds of efficacy21 and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has 
argued recently that "we are not at that point [of sanctions] yet."22 Over-
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all, it is likely that Moscow expects additional concessions from Washing-
ton on the BMD issue if its cooperation is sought in other areas. However, 
the outstanding question—which remains largely unresolved by Vice 
President Biden's visit to East/Central Europe—is how the administration 
should best balance the interests of allies large and small.
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